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CASE COMMENTS

Mr. Justice Butler, concurring in the result in the instant case,
complains that this does not seem to be the proper occasion for
"
abolishing the negative order doctrine. Whether or not this is so, the
doctrine has rightly been repudiated.
Anw R. VoGorm
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE
DETERMINATION AS TO FACT
The state constitution' authorized the general assembly to establish new judicial districts "having due regard to territory, business,
and population." A new district was established by the legislature
and suit was brought to enjoin the newly appointed judge thereof from
discharging any of the duties of his office, on the ground that the general assembly failed to exercise due regard for territory, business, and
population. Defendant demurred to the petition, alleging that the
court had no authority to review the legislative finding as to those
facts. The demurrer was overruled on the basis that it was the duty
of the court to determine whether the actual facts justified the creation of the new district. Willis v. Jonson, 275 Ky. 538, 121 S. W. (2d)
2
904 (1938).
The Kentucky court apparently decides whether or not it will
review the legislative determination of fact, by investigating whether
or not the act was passed in pursuance of an express authority or duty
granted or placed upon the General Assembly by the Kentucky Constitution. If the legislature has power to act only in certain con3
tingencies, the court will look to see if such contingency exists; but
tion", see McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders, (1940) 28 Calif L. Rev. 129, 143-150; Note (1939) 18
Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 74, 79 et seq.
' By "administrative finality" Mr. Justice Frankfurter means that
findings of fact of an administrative agency will be conclusive as to
such facts. 307 U. S. 125, 142, 59 S. Ct. 754, 763, 83 L. ed. 1147, 1159
(1939). Thus, where the Interstate Commerce Commission determines
that a reshipping privilege granted by a carrier is an undue preference
not allowed by law, the court has no power to disturb that finding.
U. S. v. Louisville & N. fy., 235 U. S. 314, 35 S. Ct. 113, 59 L. ed. 245
(1914). Accord: L C. C. v. Illinois C. Ry., 215 U. S.. 452, 30 S. Ct. 155,
54 L. ed. 280 (1909); I. C. C. v. Union P. fy., 222 U. S. 451, 32 S. Ct.
108, 56 L. ed. 308 (1911). For further discussion of "administrative
finality" see McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders, (1940) 28 Calif. L. Rev. 129; Note (1939) 13 ChicagoKent L. Rev. 74.
1'Rochester Telephone Corp. v. U. S., 307 U. S. 125, 146, 59 S. Ct.
754, 765, 83 L. ed. 1147, 1161 (1939).
Ky. Const., Sects. 128 and 132.
2On a second appeal the court reviewed the evidence upon which
the Legislature acted, and finding that it did not contradict the constitutional provision, affirmed the decision of the trial court. Willis
279 Ky. 416, 130 S. W. (2d) 828 (1939).
v. Jonson,
3
Zimmerman v. Brooks, 118 Ky. 85, 80 S. W. 443 (1904); Ragland
v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S. W. 865 (1907); Scott v. McCreary,
148 Ky. 791, 147 S. W. 903 (1912); Nolan v. Jones, 215 Ky. 2&8, 184
S. W. 1054 (1926).
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when the course of action of the legislature is unlimited by the Constitution, a judicial review thereof is beyond the authority of the
court.4
Pursuant to this policy, in the present case the court, interpreting
Section 128, read therein a limitation on absolute legislative discretion
in the creation of a new judicial district, and proceeded to determine
whether -the General Assembly had acted in accordance with this
restriction. Thus the court said (p. 545):
"It was the duty of the Legislature in the creation of a new
district to have due regard to territory, business, and population;
and it is our duty to examine tldie facts in order to determine
whether or not there was any evidence to support the legislative
conclusion that a new district was necessary."
Just what is the duty placed upon the General Assembly by Section 128? The standard to which the Legislature must adhere is not so
precise and concrete that it will admit only one conclusion, as is the
case for example, in Section 138 providing that one county may constitute a district when it attains a certain population. In an application
of that section of the Constitution, either a county has the requisite
population or it has not, and a determination of that question is completely objective-capable of definite ascertainment-so that if the Legislature deems a county to have that number of residents it can be
definitely shown that the assembly is right or that it is wrong. There
is no room for differences of opinion.
Section 128 presents an entirely different problem. The limitation
upon the legislative discretion is that there must be "due regard". No
certain facts must exist nor is it necessary to comply with specific
requirements. There is no standard by which the propriety of the
legislative action can be gauged, for there is no precise criterion
to guide the court. It cannot be said definitely either that the Legislature had or that it did not have due regard, for that is an abstract
term subject to wide differences of interpretation. The sole restriction
upon action of the Legislature is that it have "due regard for territory,
business, and population", and when it passes an act under this section, there is in effect a declaration that it has had such due regard.
The limitation is subjective and a review by another body is not contemplated by the state Constitution.
When the court presumes to exercise a review of the General
Assembly's determination that it has had due regard in enacting a
bill, the court in reality is substituting its own conception of "due
I Moore v. City of Georgetown, 127 Ky. 409, 105 S. W. 905 (1907);
v. McChesney, 128 Ky. 363, 108 S. W. 322 (3.908)
Richardson
5
Does not this analysis accord with the court's interpretation of
Section 156 of the Kentucky Constitution, to the effect that since
that section provides that the Legislature shall act upon evidence in
the classification of cities and towns, the legislative finding is not
subject to judicial review? Green v. Comlth., 95 Ky. 233, 16 K. L. R.
161, 24 S. W. 610 (1894); Griffin v. Powell, 143 Ky. 276, 136 S. W. 626
(1911). Does this differ from the requirement in Section 128 that the
Legislature shall have due regard?
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regard" for that of the Legislature in the face of the constitutional
provision which to all intents and purposes contemplates a subjective
determination. Thus it would seem that under this section of the Kentucky Constitution, the question of whether or not the Legislature
exercised due regard for territory, business, and population is solely
for that body, and its determination upon that matter should not be
subject to a review of a co-ordinate branch of the government.
B. H. HENARD.
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF VICIOUSNESS OF DOMESTIC
ANIMAL
Plaintiff, seeking damages for personal injuries due to the bite of
an allegedly vicious dog, was not permitted to offer evidence that the
dog had severely injured a bird dog and was vicious toward other
dogs, or that the dog had a general reputation for viciousness. The
court said: "The first (plaintiff's exception to the rejection of evidence
that defendant's dog had bitten other dogs) is quite a novel proposition. The instant question was the dog's propensity to attack a human.
...
In an action for personal injury it is not sufficient to show that
the owner of a dog had knowledge that it was accustomed to bite
other animals." Fowler v. Helck, 278 Ky. 361, 128 S. W. (2d) 564
(1939).
The popular belief that every dog is entitled to one bite is not
supported by authority. It is not essential to show that the dog has
actually bitten some person and that the owner is cognizant of that
fact, provided the owner has seen or heard enough to convince a man
of ordinary prudence that the animal is inclinded to commit the class
of injuries involved. The question is whether the notice is sufficient
"to put the owner on his guard, and to require him to anticipate the
injury which has actually occurred."' Goode v. Martin- held that the
owner's knowledge of the dangerous character of his dogs might be
Inferred from his habit of tying them by day. The Restatement of the
Lazo of Torts makes the possessor of a domestic animal liable where
he has reason to know (knows or from facts known to him should
know) that the animal has dangerous propensities abnormal to its
class.3
"Reynolds v. Hussey, 64 N. H. 64, 5 Atl. 458 (1886). See Rider v.
White, 65 N. Y. 54, 22 Am. Rep. 600 (1875), where defendant who knew
that his seven large watch dogs rushed out and pursued passersby,
and had posted a sign "Beware of Dogs" was held to have had knowledge of their propensity to attack and bite mankind.
-57 Md. 606, 40 Am. Rep. 448 (1881) (the defendant's dogs were
loosed at night to guard his property and were personally tied each
morning by the defendant).
3Section 509. Brune v. De Benedetty, 261 S. W. 930 (Mo. App.
3$24), seems to support this section. The plaintiff based his case upon
the viciousness of the defendant's dog superinduced by rabies. The
court said that defendant knew the propensity of a rabid dog to attack
mankind.

